Despite the far-reaching liberalization of the French banking system over the past quarter century, French banks suffered far less in the recent international financial crisis than banks in the United Kingdom and Germany. However, the French system also suffered far more -at least in the first stage of the crisis -than the banking systems of Southern Europe. By several measures, French banks were world leaders in financial innovation and the French banking system was highly exposed to international market movements. The limited impact of the crisis, however, owed to the specificities of French 'market-based banking'. Deliberate state action over the two decades prior to the crisis created a specific kind of banking system and encouraged forms of financial innovation, the unintentional consequence of which was the limited exposure to the securitization that caused the damage wrought during the financial crisis.
Introduction
French banks and their representative associations explain the comparative stability of the French banking system during the international financial crisis that erupted in 2007 in terms of a 'balanced business model' with both a strong retail base and a full range of investment banking activities (Lee 2010; Pauget 2009 ; Ministry of Finance officials 20 October 2010) . This article explains this 'balanced business model' as the product of French state disengagement from the financial sector since the mid-1980s but also continued state intervention. The specificities of this intervention involved the creation of national banking champions, a highly consolidated, saturated and competitive retail banking sector, cross-shareholding networks centred around banks, a closed banking system with only limited foreign presence due to both de facto protectionism (despite the encouragement of open equity markets) and a legislated bias towards retail for some of the mutual banks. The French state also deliberatelyand very successfully -encouraged specific forms of financial innovation, notably derivatives. The unintended consequence of this action was that French banks downplayed securitization and the purchase of securitized products, thus limiting the impact of the financial crisis. The state was less successful in its repeated efforts to facilitate securitization. Banks themselves were agents of change, notably through their efforts to expand in the context of sluggish domestic economic growth and a saturated domestic retail market. French banks engaged increasingly in 'market-based banking' activities and expanded their retail operations abroad. The focus of this analysis parallels that of Mary O'Sullivan (2007) which emphasises the French state's role in directing financial market reform but also highlights the post-liberalization role of economic actors in shaping the financial system. However, the focus here is on how the intended and less deliberate effects of state action shaped the features of French banking that can be described as systemic.
John Zysman's (1983) analysis of France as the best example of a state-led creditbased financial system provides little guidance as to the French variety of financial capitalism today. However, the footprint of the state, through a directed and incomplete liberalization, has created a specific kind of financial system, the intended and unintended features of which have been revealed in the impact of the international financial crisis on the system since 2008. The argument of this paper thus builds upon the CPE literature that stresses the transformation of French capitalism away from a state-led model yet struggles to categorise France in the Liberal Market Economy (LME) / Coordinated Market Economy (CME) dichotomy of the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) literature Culpepper 2008) or depicts it as a unique hybrid form (Boyer 1997; Hancké 2001) . 1 The argument here about the development of the French banking system also aligns with the conclusions reached by Vivien Schmidt (2003 Schmidt ( , 2009 ) who describes France as a state-enhanced / stateinfluenced form of capitalism. However, the claim of an important legacy of state intervention does not suggest, let alone prove, continued state intervention, even of a more modest kind.
Similarly, France's financial system cannot be easily categorised. It contains features of the liberalized, deregulated and more capital market-based British system but also features of the more protected, regulated and bank credit-based financial systems of Southern Europe and Germany. In Zysman's (1983) depiction of the French financial system as 'state-led credit-based', the French state directed finance through state owned banks in the Circuit du Trésor system (see also Loriaux 1991) . Despite liberalization and the privatization of most of the large French banks from the mid1980s, studies from the mid-1990s continued to assign a central importance to the state in the context of a 'financial network economy' (Story and Walter 1997; Underhill 1997 ). This description was already being challenged (Morin 1998; and had become less valid by the early 2000s. Yet France remained difficult to situate in terms of the credit-based / capital-based dichotomy, with Andreas Hackethal (2000, 13) describing the French financial system as a 'special case which seems hard to classify'.
Indeed, snap shots of the French financial system tell us very different stories if we look at non-financial company (NFC) external finance or total financial system assets -two typical measures used to categorise financial systems. French NFC external finance moved from heavy reliance on bank lending prior to the 1990s to heavy reliance on equity finance by 2000 (see Table 1 ). France thus might be best described as having an 'equity-dependent but still largely bank-based financial system' an apparent contradiction explained largely in terms of the limited position of domestic lending in total bank assets (see Figure 2 below ). Yet in the 2000s, bank lending rose in real and relative importance as a source of finance for NFCs in relation to equity issuance and securities (Table 2) , paralleling developments in several advanced industrialised economies, including the US and UK (Hardie and Maxfield 2011) . Contradicting previous trends and expectations, this largely reflected the end of big privatization programmes, bear equity markets and low real interest rates. As will be shown below, 'market-based banking' also contributed to the real and relative rise in bank lending.
<TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE> <FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE> Before proceeding, it is helpful to explain the concept market-based banking as used in this paper and its significance in terms of how we should understand financial systems. The concept encompasses a variety of new types of banking businessrather than the 'traditional' banking of deposit taking and lending -that burgeoned in the two decades leading up to the crisis (see Hardie and Howarth 2011) . It includes the trading of a range of derivatives -equity, interest and exchange rate. It also involves selling loans rather than keeping them on the banks' books as traditionally done. Securitization is part of this process, meaning that the loans are pooled and then re-divided into a new financial product containing 'pieces' of many different loans. A second new type of business was selling loans, not just to any other institution through the market, but 'selling' loans to arms-length but related 'special purpose entities' or 'structured investment vehicles' (SIVs). This type of business also sometimes involved trying to protect against the risks involved by buying or selling credit default swaps (CDSs). Both securitization and hiding risk through CDSs were also involved in a third type of new business: holding loans on the books but using them as collateral to borrow several times the value of the loans. Total French bank losses have been lower than those in the US, UK and Germany, and losses to bank assets and GDP have been far lower than a range of additional European countries, including the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland (see Table   3 ). Retail lending nonetheless increased significantly in total terms at both the domestic and international levels ( Table 5 ). The internationalization of French banking contained an important retail element (see also Table 6 ). In comparison, the internationalization of German and British banking was almost exclusively in corporate lending and investment banking (on the UK see 
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Assets. The trading activity of French banks and, in particular, the use of derivatives in trading activities increased rapidly in the decade leading to the crisis (see Table 7 ).
Taking the banking system at large, financial assets held for trading exceeded both The rapid expansion of bank trading activities in the decade leading up to the crisis (Table 7) both reflects the saturation of domestic markets and the relative strength of French investment banking.
Other forms of state intervention help explain the retail focus of the French banking system and bank internationalization. Government legislation strongly affected the composition and allocation of a large part of financial savings through numerous schemes to mobilize and direct savings and credit towards programs judged to be in the public interest. These schemes encompassed certain controls on interest rates and fees, the design by the government of various savings products (notably the Livret A),
the centralization of about a quarter of bank deposits in a fund managed by the stateowned CDC, restrictions on the use of funds collected through some savings products, and significant differences in tax treatment between financial products. In 2003, about 80 per cent of bank deposits (including checking accounts) were subject to significant product and/or price prescriptions, and differences in tax treatment have steered household savings towards life insurance products and saving for house purchases (IMF 2004) . Amongst other effects, these policies distorted competition in the banking sector by restricting the distribution of certain products with only certain institutions, notably the public sector or mutual banks, allowed to offer specific taxexempt or high rate savings products, thus placing commercial banks, both domestic and foreign, at a competitive disadvantage (Candida 2000) . In the 1980s and 90s, French conservative governments encouraged the emergence of a limited number of large, vertically integrated banking groups controlled by French corporate shareholders -in a complex network of cross-shareholding with national firms, both to improve the stability of the system and to foster national championsand a reflection of longstanding industrial strategy (Cohen 1995; Hayward 1995; Schmidt 1996) . In response to increasing international and domestic competitive French banks with NFCs -never as close as in Germany -became more distant (Bertero, 1994; O'Sullivan, 2007) as elements of the 'financial network' economy deteriorated (Morin, 1998 (Morin, , 2000 . To conclude, French banks operated as profit-maximisers and pursued domestic and international expansion. However, the manner in which they did this was dictated by conditions in the French banking system established to a large extent deliberately by the French state. State efforts in actively prodding recently privatised banks to engage in derivatives trading and securitization also point to the relevance of work by scholars who point to continued but more limited forms of state intervention to cope with contemporary challenges in global capitalism -in additional to Schmidt (2003 Schmidt ( , 2009 ), see Levy (2006) and Ben Clift's (2011a; 2011b) elaboration on post-dirigisme. Clearly, a crucial transformation in French political economy remains the move to a 'financial market' form of capitalism, as large and many medium-sized NFCs turned increasingly to the equity markets (often foreign) for finance and French banks looked abroad and to other activities to compensate (Morin, 1998 (Morin, , 2000 . heavily exposed to Greece (€67.8) and the second most exposed to Spain. French banks were also the most exposed to Italy at €336.3bn (end September 2010 figures, BIS). 6 The internationalization of British assets and liabilities was far higher at well over 60 per cent of the total for both and 250 per cent of GDP. German internationalized assets were at 55 per cent of the total and at a similar level of GDP (ECB Statistical Data Warehouse).
7 Calyon issued more CDOs than Goldman, Lehman, Bear Stearns, Morgan Stanley or JP Morgan. 13 The euro denominated net foreign position owed to limited French bank exposure to US assets (including securities) and the euro area focus of French bank internationalization.
14 Crédit Agricole was later part-listed on the CAC-40 stock exchange.
15 A significant part of the Livret A financed social housing (and was placed on the balance sheet of the CDC) and thus did not constitute a resource for other banking activities. Nonetheless, the Livret A effectively distorted competition in retail banking. Acharya and Schnabl, 2010: 54 
